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THE DISMEMBERMENT OF CHINA

by

T. A. BISSON

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JAPAN'S recent conquest of Manchuria and Jehol has rounded out ninety years of territorial losses by China, starting with the British annexation of Hongkong in 1842. During this period China has lost control of roughly 2,400,000 square miles of territory out of a total of nearly 4,500,000 once ruled by the Manchu empire. Of these lost territories, France has annexed Indo-China; Britain has taken Hongkong, Upper Burma, and Sikkim, and dominates Tibet; Japan has annexed Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, and controls Manchuria and Jehol; and the Soviet Union dominates Outer Mongolia. While the seizure of Manchuria therefore constitutes merely the latest in a long series of similar episodes, it also has a special significance with respect to developments in the immediate future. For the loss of Manchuria has had an unsettling effect throughout the remaining outlying territories of China, and may be the prelude to a new era of territorial dismemberment.

The seriousness of this threat becomes clearer when it is realized that the eighteen provinces of China proper have been dominated historically by a double ring of outlying territories. The outer ring consists of Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet. Three of these areas are already subject to foreign control, while the fourth—Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkistan—is now in the throes of political upheaval. The inner ring consists of Inner Mongolia on the north and "Inner" Tibet on the west, separated by the narrow western tongue of Kansu province. Inner Mongolia has been recently organized into the four new provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia.¹ Of these, Japan now occupies Jehol and the strategic eastern edge of Chahar, near the city of Dolonor, which dominates the passes leading further into Mongolia. "Inner" Tibet is composed of the newly organized provinces of Chinghai² and Hsikang.³ During the past two years large sections of Ching-

hai and Hsikang provinces have been occupied by British-trained Tibetan troops.

China's outer ring of territories has thus been almost wholly lost, while the inner ring is under partial foreign occupation and in immediate danger of complete alienation. The rôle of China's land frontier, as contrasted with its maritime frontier, lends particular importance to the growing encroachments of foreign powers on its outlying territories.

CHINA'S LAND AND SEA FRONTIERS

China's historic frontier, symbolized by the Great Wall, has been the vast inland region embraced by Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet. From these regions, particularly on the north, successive conquests of the more settled and prosperous sections of China have been launched. When China was weak and the shock overwhelming, the assaults were met by the slow process of assimilating the barbarian conquerors. When China was strong, imperial policy was primarily concerned with playing one tribal group off against another on the frontier. The most recent examples of this process were the Mongol Dynasty (1270-1368) and the Manchu Dynasty (1644-1912). Both experienced the traditional course of internal decay under the enervating influences of the advanced Chinese civilization, resulting finally in the restoration of Chinese rule. While the Manchu dynasty was still young and vigorous, however, its frontier policy, particularly in relation to the Mongols, achieved a series of triumphs in the classic style of China's imperial diplomacy.

Early in the nineteenth century, the Manchu rulers were confronted with a totally new threat in the shape of Western aggression. The attack came by way of the sea, and utilized the modern machine techniques of the West. Past experience, gained in dealing with the customary barbarian incursions over China's land frontier, furnished no guide to the Manchus in meeting the new and incalculable dangers of this maritime onslaught by a technically advanced people.⁴ Nor could the Westerners,

1. Certain small sections of some of the northern provinces of China proper were also incorporated in these new provinces. Cf. M. T. Z. Tyau, *Two Years of Nationalist China* (Shanghai, Kelly and Walsh, 1930), p. 72-73.

2. Consisting of Kokonor and the Hsining district of Kansu province. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

3. Formerly the Chuanpien Special District of western Szechuan province. *Ibid.*

4. Cf. discussion by Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict* (New York, Macmillan, 1932), p. 296-298.

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who operated from distant countries and did not settle permanently in China, be easily assimilated. The attempt to play one Western power against another ended in a series of disasters. China's coastal areas were overrun, and one territory after another was seized. Foreign leaseholds, concessions and settlements were established in the very heart of the country. All the paraphernalia of modern economic imperialism was imposed on China, including loans, indemnities, railway concessions, customs control, extra-territoriality, and the acceptance of foreign naval and military occupation.

For a brief period, following the end of the World War, China's nationalist revival promised to reverse the trend of foreign aggression, which had apparently reached its climax in Japan's twenty-one demands of 1915. From 1917 to 1931 an increasingly vigorous campaign was waged against the "unequal treaties," and a series of notable victories markedly improved China's international status.⁵ In September 1931, with the beginning of Japanese military operations in Manchuria, this gradual curtailment of foreign rights in China was sharply checked. Japan's seizure of Manchuria and Jehol constituted, in fact, a new climax in the story of the past century of foreign aggression in China. In one sense it represented the culmination of the maritime onslaught from the West, since both in the approach by sea and the use of modern technique Japan was following the typical pattern of a Western power.⁶ On the other hand, the creation of Manchoukuo bids fair to usher in a new epoch of Chinese history, in which the play of continental policies and ambitions may once again occupy the center of the stage.^{6a} For Manchoukuo sets Japan astride the northern edge of China's land frontier, and looks inland toward Mongolia for expansion. Furthermore, two Western powers—the Soviet Union in Outer Mongolia and Great Britain in Tibet—have also taken up positions on China's land frontier. This newly forged continental ring of foreign powers is further rounded out on the south, where French influence is reaching up from Indo-China into Yunnan province.

Between the territorial possessions of the foreign powers on China's land and sea frontiers lie three disputed regions—Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and "Inner" Tibet. Each of these areas is at present in upheaval, with Chinese rule threatened either by internal revolt, or foreign aggression, or both. Each of these areas is also subject to the conflicting interests of

two or more of the foreign powers. Inner Mongolia constitutes a sphere of conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union, Sinkiang between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, and certain Yunnan border regions between Great Britain and France. In the course of the next few years the results of the rivalries over these areas will not only determine the extent to which China is able to maintain its territorial integrity, but will also go far in deciding the future balance of power in the Far East.

RACE AND RELIGION ON THE BORDER

International rivalries on China's land frontier are conditioned by unique racial and religious factors. The racial composition of China's outlying territories is exceedingly varied. In only one section—Manchuria—have the Chinese become the predominant element in the population. The Manchus have virtually ceased to exist as a separate race and nationality. Both in language and culture they have been almost completely assimilated by the Chinese. As a political entity the Manchus consequently provide a relatively weak support for the new Manchurian régime sponsored by the Japanese, except in one respect—the position held by Pu Yi as a scion of the old Manchurian ruling house.

Outside Manchuria the Chinese are nearly everywhere a small minority of both the inner and outer frontier populations. The Mongols total approximately five millions. They are most numerous in Inner and Outer Mongolia, but considerable numbers of them are also located in western Manchuria, northern Sinkiang, Chinghai and Tibet. In contrast to the Manchus, the Mongols have stubbornly retained their racial identity. Inter-marriage between Mongol and Chinese is rare; when it occurs, the latter is usually forced to make the adaptation to Mongol ways of life.⁷ As a result, Mongol national consciousness has not only survived as a vital force, but is undergoing a renaissance which makes it a political factor to be reckoned with at the present time.

The Moslems constitute another important racial group on the frontier, particularly in Kansu and Sinkiang. In all, there are possibly ten million Chinese Moslems.⁸ They retain their own religious faith and practices, but in other respects have been partially assimilated. This process, however, did not prevent the widespread Moslem revolts of the nineteenth century, which were backed by a distinctive racial and national consciousness. Moslem separatism threatens to play an equally significant rôle in the events now taking place on China's western frontier.

5. For a detailed study of this period, cf. Robert T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931* (New York, Macmillan, 1933).

6. Lattimore, *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict*, cited, p. 86-87.

6a. Cf. *Empire in the East* (New York, Doubleday Doran, 1934), p. 20.

7. Lattimore, *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict*, cited, p. 53-54.

8. K. S. Latourette, *The Chinese: Their History and Culture* (New York, Macmillan, 1934), Vol. II, p. 170-172.



A second unique factor affecting China's border areas is the Lama religion—a form of Buddhism with an elaborate ritual, a complicated clerical hierarchy, and a highly developed monastic system. Although centered in Tibet, particularly in the holy city of Lhasa, Lamaism has also become the chief religion of the Mongols; its influence therefore radiates throughout China's land frontier. Over the Lamaistic hierarchy preside the Dalai Lama and the Panchan Lama. Despite the fact that the latter represents a higher reincarnation of the Buddha, the Dalai Lama has in recent times wielded secular power in Tibet. For political reasons, the Panchan Lama has been in exile in China since 1924.

THE THREE MONGOLIAS

The founders of the Manchu dynasty originally conquered China in the middle of the seventeenth century on the basis of an alliance with the Manchurian Mongols.⁹ They then proceeded to establish their hegemony in Inner Mongolia, and from this vantage point were enabled to dominate the Mongol tribes of Outer Mongolia.¹⁰ Thereafter, for nearly 300 years, the Manchus held their mastery over China's land frontier. Even in 1911, when the dynasty was on the point of collapse, it still maintained its grip on the continental area from Tibet to Manchuria. With the establishment of the republic in 1912, the frontier system which the Manchus had enforced finally broke down. The common allegiance to the Manchu Emperor which had cemented the Mongol and other border peoples to China was irremediably undermined. Tibet and Outer Mongolia at once broke away from the Chinese republic.

Since 1912 four distinct political régimes have held control in Outer Mongolia. The first of these, which lasted from 1912 to 1918, was largely dominated by Tsarist Russia. A brief period of Chinese rule occurred in 1919-1920, succeeded by an even shorter interval of control by the White Russian adventurer, Baron Ungern von Sternberg. Both these régimes were under Japanese influence. Baron Ungern's defeat by Soviet forces was followed, on July 6, 1921, by the establishment of the revolutionary Mongol People's Government at Urga. Four years later, following treaty recognition of China's sovereignty on May

31, 1924, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Outer Mongolia. Since then, however, the Mongolian People's party has dominated the government, and Soviet advisers have been retained in many important positions.

Soviet dominance in Outer Mongolia has rested on the support of the younger Mongols, who feel that the traditional Mongol ways must be drastically reformed in order to cope with modern problems. Enrolled in the Mongolian People's party, these younger leaders have effectually dispossessed the older privileged classes of nobles and lamas. Under Soviet guidance, they are building a socialized Outer Mongolian state, so far as permitted by the limited agricultural and industrial development of an economy based chiefly on cattle raising. The stability of this régime depends on the continued adherence of the younger Mongols. From present indications its overthrow can hardly be accomplished except by outside intervention—an issue which leads to a consideration of Chinese and Japanese policy with regard to the Mongol question.

Following the collapse of the Manchu dynasty, the Mongol princes of Inner Mongolia made several abortive efforts to establish their independence through a union with Outer Mongolia.¹¹ Their failure was due partly to jealousy of the Outer Mongolian princes and fear of Russia, but more largely to a feeling of confidence in their ability to deal with republican China. In this latter respect they were grievously disappointed, despite preliminary successes in driving out the Chinese troops. Railway construction, both in Manchuria and north China, led to an influx of Chinese agricultural settlers which steadily dispossessed the Mongols of their best grazing lands. Through their ability to obtain foreign arms, the Chinese military forces eventually established a decided superiority over the Mongols. Political and economic impacts coalesced in the persons of the local Chinese officials, who were heavily interested in the land deals attending the colonization movement.¹² The crowning blow came in 1928, when Inner Mongolia was divided into the four provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ninghsia. The newly established provincial boundary lines cut ruthlessly across the Mongol tribal and league frontiers, contributing still further to the Mongols' disunity and facilitating their ultimate absorption by the Chinese.

By 1931 a well-established course had been marked out in Mongolian affairs. In Outer Mongolia a revolutionary Mongol na-

9. Lattimore, "Mongolia Enters World Affairs," *Pacific Affairs*, March 1934, p. 16, 25; also Lattimore, "The Unknown Frontier of Manchuria," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1933, p. 315, 319.

10. Manchu overlordship was built on Mongol disunity. The descendants of the heirs of Jenghis Khan, founder of the Mongol dynasty, had split into rival factions. No single Mongol leader was generally acceptable to all factions, and none had arisen powerful enough to enforce his claim to supremacy. The genius of the Manchu policy lay in the fact that, though the Mongols accepted the Manchu hegemony, they thought of themselves always as the allies and equals of the Manchu rulers, and for the most part retained their autonomy.

11. Lattimore, "Mongolia Enters World Affairs," cited, p. 17-18.

12. For an analysis of the Chinese official as entrepreneur in the colonization movement, cf. Lattimore, *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict*, cited, Chapter VI.

tionalism was building an increasingly socialized state under Soviet auspices. In Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, the Mongol princes were hopelessly enmeshed in a steadily enveloping movement of Chinese aggression. Since the early beginnings of the Chinese colonization movement, the Mongols had lost about two-thirds of their territory in Jehol, and about a third in Manchuria.¹³ Other Mongol territories in Suiyuan and Chahar provinces had been either wholly or in large part settled by Chinese. Only the Silingol territory, a long strip in northern Chahar province, had entirely escaped colonization. At this juncture, however, the Japanese occupation of Manchuria contributed a new factor which totally altered the situation.

The creation of Manchoukuo, including the Inner Mongolian province of Jehol, has resulted in the existence of three separate Mongolias, respectively under Japanese, Chinese and Soviet influence. Although the Mongolian territory within Manchoukuo hardly exceeds 100,000 square miles, it holds a Mongolian population of approximately 2,000,000. Outer Mongolia, with a million square miles of territory, contains only about 1,000,000 Mongols. The sections of Inner Mongolia still under Chinese rule also contain about 1,000,000 Mongols.¹⁴ Japan, therefore, controls the destinies of a greater section of the Mongol people than either China or the Soviet Union.

Nor has Japan failed to take advantage of the situation thus created. The Mongolian section of Manchoukuo has been newly formed into a separate province—named Hsingan—which has been placed under a Mongol governor.¹⁵ Local officials in Hsingan province are drawn mainly from the lesser Mongol tribal leaders. Mongol autonomy in this province even includes the right of the Mongols to levy and arm their own military forces. Equally important economic advantages have been conferred on the Hsingan Mongols, of which the most significant is the guarantee against further encroachment on Mongol lands by Chinese agricultural settlers. Aided by this liberal Mongol policy, the strategic location of Hsingan province fits it to become the nucleus of a large Mongol bloc serving the national interests of the conservative princes. In the neighboring Chinese provinces, the Mongol tribes and leagues are in some cases split off from their kinsmen in Manchoukuo by the arbitrarily created provincial boundary lines. The uncolonized Silingol territory of northern Chahar province, where conservative Mongol national sentiment is most assertive,

borders directly on Hsingan. Finally, the enthronement of Pu Yi as Emperor of Manchoukuo, effected on March 1, 1934, satisfies the Mongol princes that the Japanese are committed to the new status established in Manchuria. Under Emperor Kang Te the princes can unite to establish an autonomous Mongol régime on a national scale. He offers an alternative not only to Chinese penetration in Inner Mongolia but also to the revolutionary nationalism of Outer Mongolia, which would equally sweep away the privileges of the Mongol lamas and princes.

Under these circumstances, the recent appearance of a Mongol autonomy movement in Chinese Inner Mongolia was a natural development. The leadership in this movement has been assumed by a prince of the Silingol league, known by his Chinese name and title of Te Wang.¹⁶ Prince Te's immediate objective has been to overthrow the dual Chinese control—represented by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission at Nanking and by the local provincial officials—to which the Mongols have been subjected in recent years. Under this system, Mongol complaints have been shuffled back and forth between the national and local officials without ever reaching final settlement. The Mongol princes have demanded that their territories in Chahar and Suiyuan should constitute a separate Mongol province, not only with internal tribal autonomy but also with a Mongol governor who could deal directly with the national authorities at Nanking.

In September 1933 the Nanking government sent special representatives to north China to deal with the issues raised by the Mongol demands. Negotiations between the princes and the Nanking delegates eventually resulted in an agreement to set up a "special administrative area," consisting of the Mongol territories in Chahar and Suiyuan, which would have direct relations with Nanking.¹⁷ This agreement, however, was bitterly opposed by the Chinese provincial officials, and has not been put into effect. Instead, the Nanking government has attempted to enforce an alternative scheme, advocated by the local Chinese officials, whereby certain Mongol districts within the existing provinces would be set up as autonomous units.¹⁸

So far, under Te Wang's lead, the Inner Mongolian princes have dealt mainly with Nanking. In this respect, however, they are merely playing for time before the larger Soviet-Japanese issues are raised.¹⁹ The actual choice confronting the Mongols is be-

13. Lattimore, "Mongolia Enters World Affairs," cited, p. 23.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 19-20.

16. Cf. Lattimore, "Mongolia Enters World Affairs," cited, p. 24-25.

17. *New York Herald Tribune*, December 31, 1933.

18. This proposal has been denounced by the Mongol princes as a repudiation of the original agreement. *New York Times*, January 23, 1934.

19. Lattimore, "Mongolia Enters World Affairs," cited, p. 25; "The Unknown Frontier of Manchuria," cited, p. 329.

tween revolutionary nationalism in association with the Soviet Union and conservative nationalism under the auspices of Japan.²⁰ With the appearance of Manchoukuo, the Mongol princes have been offered the hope of survival on the basis of their old traditions. The princes know that the revolutionary régime in Outer Mongolia, despite its strength, rests on minority support; that the older generation has not yet died out, and still provides the material for a counter-revolution. With this in mind, they see the possibility of re-establishing a Mongol nation unified along conservative lines and virtually independent, except for allegiance to the Manchoukuo Emperor. On the other hand, the princes represent a decaying and backward tradition, and in recent years have compromised themselves by placing their class interests above the national welfare. Their power is further sapped by a strong Young Mongol movement, still largely underground, which advocates a program of thoroughgoing "modernization."²¹ The young Mongols are now only partially Communist, but in order to counteract the present drift toward Manchoukuo they may be compelled to seek aid from Outer Mongolia. Such a development would also unite the Mongol people, but on the basis of a social revolution led by the younger Mongols in cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Japan and the Soviet Union thus face each other in Mongolia as the champions of divergent class interests among the Mongols. The ultimate political stakes in this region, however, far transcend the interplay of local Mongolian forces. Mongolia's vast land area constitutes an important military flank against which decisive operations may be directed in the event of a Soviet-Japanese clash.²² By setting up the broadly autonomous Hsingan province, Japan has made a bid to the dissatisfied Mongol princes in the neighboring Chinese-ruled provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan. So long as China retains control of this buffer area, a tolerable balance of power exists between Japan and the Soviet Union. Neither power, however can look with equanimity on the absorption of this region by the other. The Mongol autonomy movement, as well as the activities of Japanese forces in the Dolonor area of Chahar province,²³ are indications of the temporary and precarious character of the existing balance. Under the circumstances, the Mongols occupy a strategic position which confers on their movements an im-

portance far superior to their real strength. Vigorous Mongol action at this juncture can influence the result of a struggle which may determine the possibility of national survival for the Mongols, as well as the basis on which their national life is to be established.

"INNER" TIBET

For fifty years the strategic position of Tibet in Central Asia has made it the focus of international rivalries, chiefly between China, Great Britain and Russia. The Mongol, Ming and Manchu dynasties had successively asserted and maintained suzerainty over Tibet. During the nineteenth century, while the Manchu empire was declining, Britain was extending its control in north India. The elimination of Manchu-Tibetan influence in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim toward the end of the century brought the British sphere into direct contact with Tibet. By 1900 Britain had come to regard Tibet as a frontier outpost of India, particularly useful as a buffer against the Russian advance from the north.

Early in 1904, a British expedition under Colonel Younghusband was sent into Tibet to counteract the growing Russian influence and enforce trade agreements which the Tibetan authorities were disregarding. The mission was attacked by the Tibetans, who killed 37 British soldiers and themselves lost 1,500 men.²⁴ Lhasa was entered by the British forces on August 3, after the Dalai Lama had fled to Mongolia, and a convention was signed on September 7, 1904. This convention levied an indemnity of £500,000 on Tibet, opened three Tibetan cities as trade marts, and specified that British troops might occupy the Chumbi valley for three years after these provisions had been fulfilled. Tibet also agreed not to pledge its revenues nor grant territorial or commercial concessions to any foreign power "without the previous consent of the British government."²⁵

Vigorous Manchu action from 1908 to 1911 partially counteracted Britain's growing influence in Tibetan affairs. In January 1908 China paid off the Tibetan indemnity, which Britain had meanwhile reduced by two-thirds. The Chumbi valley was then evacuated, although British garrisons were left at the trade marts. In December 1909 the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa but early in 1910 fear of the Manchu authorities caused him to flee to India, where he was cordially received by the British authorities who paid the expenses of his residence at Darjeeling for nearly two years.²⁶ The out-

20. Lattimore, "Mongolia Enters World Affairs," cited, p. 24, 27-28.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 27; also "The Unknown Frontier of Manchuria," cited, p. 329.

22. Lattimore, "Mongolia Enters World Affairs," cited, p. 21-22.

23. For Japanese road-building, construction of airplane bases and other activities in this area, cf. *New York Times*, March 28, April 4, 19, 1934.

24. Morse and MacNair, *Far Eastern International Relations* (New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1931), p. 558-559.

25. *British Foreign and State Papers*, Vol. 98, p. 148-150.

26. David Macdonald, *Twenty Years in Tibet* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1932), p. 98.

break of the Chinese revolution in 1911 disrupted the Manchu garrison in Tibet and led to its expulsion by the Tibetans.

The founding of the Republic thus saw the removal of the last vestiges of control which the Manchus had exercised in Tibet. In December 1912 Britain restored the Dalai Lama to power, and through his influence and friendship established a supremacy which has since been virtually unchallenged. Efforts of Yuan Shih-kai to reconquer Tibet with republican troops in 1912 were frustrated by Britain's intervention, which barred Chinese forces from entering Tibet. The last comprehensive effort to settle Tibetan issues was made at a triangular conference between British, Chinese and Tibetan representatives held at Simla, in British India, from October 1913 to July 1914. As a result of this conference, Great Britain and Tibet concluded a convention setting up an "Inner" and "Outer" Tibet. The former was to be controlled directly by China, the latter would become "an autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty and British protection." Inner Tibet, in this convention, took in sections of western Ssuechuan and Kansu provinces which had been conquered by the Manchus nearly two hundred years earlier. Outer Tibet, moreover, was so drawn as to include the Chiamdo area, which at the time was under direct Chinese administration. This agreement, though accepted by the Chinese delegates, was at once repudiated by the Chinese government. Britain, however, notified China that the Anglo-Tibetan convention was binding, and proceeded to exclude China from trade advantages in Tibet until the Chinese government should have officially recognized the new status.²⁷ No such recognition has ever been extended.

Since 1914 British influence in Tibetan affairs has steadily increased, both politically and economically.²⁸ Growth of trade with India has made the Indian rupee dominant in Tibet. A British visa is required for entrance via the main route from India; access by way of China is virtually barred. The extension of the Indian telegraph line from Gyantse to Lhasa, a British enterprise paid for by the Tibetan government, was completed in 1923. British political officers visit Tibet each year for varying periods, and British consular officers regularly perform political functions. The Tibetan administration is being increasingly staffed with Tibetan returned students from England. Finally, with the approval of the Government of India, the Tibetan army has been partially modernized through the train-

ing given by "the British and Indian officers of the Trade Agents' escort" at Gyantse.²⁹

Within recent years, this reorganized army has been steadily advancing into "Inner" Tibet. In defense of such action, the Tibetan authorities can point to the fact that, prior to its conquest by the Manchus in 1727, this region had been part of Tibet. On the other hand it had since been partially occupied by Chinese settlers, and the Anglo-Tibetan convention of 1914 had recognized China's right of direct administration. A long period of desultory Sino-Tibetan fighting over the Chiamdo area was definitely resolved in favor of Tibet by an agreement signed on August 19, 1918.³⁰ It was partly to offset the historic Tibetan claim and partly to counteract immediate Tibetan pressure that the Nanking government reconstituted much of "Inner" Tibet as Hsikang and Chinghai provinces in 1928. Early in 1932, however, the Tibetans initiated a far-reaching advance which has led to their occupation of a large section of Hsikang and Chinghai provinces.³¹ Since no British troops or officials are directly involved in these operations, Britain is in a position to disclaim any immediate responsibility. Tibet, on the other hand, is able to claim that it is merely restoring its historic boundary.

With the death of the Dalai Lama on December 17, 1933, a new factor of paramount importance entered into the complicated Tibetan situation. For over twenty years British dominance of Tibetan policy has rested on the friendly relationship maintained with the Dalai Lama. The latter's supremacy in Tibetan internal affairs has been unquestioned since the Panchan Lama was driven out in 1924.³² During these years, the Panchan Lama has lived in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. He receives a large subsidy³³ from the Nanking government, and is an important member of the Commission on Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs. The Dalai Lama's death has presented the Panchan Lama with an unusually favorable opportunity of returning to Tibet. A large proportion of the powerful Tibetan ecclesiastics, confined not only to the Panchan Lama's supporters, have been antagonized by the "modernization" policy of the Dalai

29. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

30. This agreement was negotiated by Eric Teichman, a British consular officer on the Sino-Tibetan frontier. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

31. *New York Times*, August 14, 21, September 12, October 16, November 27, 1932; December 4, 20, 1933.

32. The Panchan Lama's eviction resulted chiefly from complications arising out of the expansion of the Tibetan standing army after 1920, following the visit of a British mission under Sir Charles Bell to Lhasa. Both the powerful monasteries and the common people were opposed to the increased financial burdens involved in this policy. When additional funds for military purposes were demanded from his monastery at Tashihunpo, the Panchan Lama was placed in an intolerable situation. Meeting no response from his appeal to the British Agent, he finally fled from Tibet and took refuge in China. Macdonald, *Twenty Years in Tibet*, cited, p. 230-231.

33. Reputed to total \$400,000 Mex. annually.

27. Morse and MacNair, *Far Eastern International Relations*, cited, p. 562.

28. For details, cf. Macdonald, *Twenty Years in Tibet*, cited.

Lama and his Ministers of State, and the present juncture offers them an opportunity to regain control of Tibetan internal affairs. On the other hand, the unusually hurried selection of the Dalai Lama's successor, announced on January 9, 1934, was apparently carried out by the pro-British coterie at Lhasa.³⁴ Under these circumstances, the Panchan Lama has shown no immediate intention of returning to Tibet.

REVOLT IN SINKIANG

The vast western territory of Chinese Turkistan has been more or less closely attached to China since the Han dynasty, at the beginning of the Christian era. Following suppression of the great Moslem revolt of 1864-1877 in western China, the Manchu rulers reorganized Turkistan as China's nineteenth province under the name of Sinkiang, or the New Dominion. Although its size and remoteness places it in the category of Tibet and Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang has until recently been one of the best-ruled and most stable areas of China. The Chinese inhabitants constitute a minority of some 150,000 out of a total population of possibly three or four millions.

Sinkiang is roughly divided into a northern and southern section by the Tien Shan range.³⁵ The southern oases circling the Taklamakan desert from Hami through Karashar to Kashgar and Khotan are inhabited chiefly by a Turki people, of mixed racial stock yet speaking an old and pure Turkish dialect. In the southwest, the region of Kashgaria is the center of a caravan trade with British India and Afghanistan.³⁶ North of the Tien Shan range lies the smaller but politically more important section of Sinkiang known as Jungaria, crossed by the caravan route from China to Russia. Urumchi (Tihwa), the capital of Sinkiang, is strategically located at the center of this route, dominating both northern and southern Sinkiang. The largest racial groups of Jungaria are the Chinese Moslems, known as Tungans, and nomad peoples such as the Torgot Mongols and Moslem Kasaks. Soviet commercial influence is strongest in this area, although of late the Soviet Union has also become an effective competitor of the British interests in Kashgaria.

The most immediate threat to Chinese rule in Sinkiang is the large Moslem population, made up of the Turkis in the south

and the Tungans and Kasaks in the north. In addition, there is a strong bloc of several million Moslems in the neighboring province of Kansu. Racial, language and sectarian differences separate these various Moslem groups, yet there is a persistent urge, shared by every ambitious Moslem general, toward the creation of a unified Moslem state in western China. Moslem separatism therefore constitutes a danger in itself; further, it provides a ready-made tool that might be turned to advantage by foreign powers. Once started, a Moslem uprising would push on through Kansu and seriously menace the interior of China proper. Even without foreign aid, the Moslem revolt of the sixties penetrated Shensi and Hupeh provinces, and was only put down after ten years' stiff campaigning. No general Moslem uprising has taken place under the republican régime; should it occur at this juncture, it would shake the republic.³⁷

Since 1928 the stability of the Chinese régime in Sinkiang has been seriously threatened. Manchu rule had rested essentially on a skeleton civil administration supported by a numerically insignificant military force, which played the troops of one subject race off against another. In 1911, when the revolution occurred, this system was smoothly taken over by the Chinese republican rulers.³⁸ It has since been maintained virtually unchanged, even under the Nanking government.³⁹ From 1911 to 1928 Sinkiang was ruled with ability and success by Governor Yang Tseng-hsin. His long rule was due partly to his political acumen, and partly to favorable economic conditions in the province. The period of general prosperity in Sinkiang, however, was drawing to a close in the latter days of Governor Yang's administration. After 1925 the prevailing political disorder in China increasingly shut off the trade routes to the sea-coast. At the same time Soviet economic penetration of Sinkiang was becoming steadily more effective. Governor Yang's assassination in 1928 marked the end of an era. The growing difficulties confronting Chinese rule were thereafter handled by less able political leaders.

These difficulties were the result of a complex interaction of both internal and external influences. Internally, several decades of

37. Lattimore, "Chinese Turkistan or Hsinchiang," cited.

38. The operation of this system, however, requires skillful handling of the relatively autonomous native groups. Even where the administration is most direct, as in the settled Turki agricultural communities, native "headmen" are still interposed between the subject race and the Chinese officials. In a few cases, as at Hami, the older type of Turki "native state"—in which the prince ruled under the general supervision of a Chinese resident official—still survives. Among the Mongol and Kasak tribes, Chinese rule is wholly indirect. *Ibid.*

39. At present, the *de facto* Chinese governor in Sinkiang is nominally appointed "chairman" of the local Kuomintang committee by the Nanking government; actually, the members of the local committee are the executive subordinates chosen by the governor. *Ibid.*

34. The complicated traditional process involved in the selection of a new Dalai Lama, whose spirit is supposedly reincarnated in an infant born at the moment of his passing, usually occupies a period of several years. In the present case, the choice was not only rushed beyond all precedent, but by a coincidence the infant was discovered in the environs of Lhasa, when he might have appeared in any quarter of the far-spread Lama territories. Cf. Rodney Gilbert, "Hokum on the Potala?" *New York Herald Tribune*, January 14, 1934.

35. Lattimore, "Chinese Turkistan or Hsinchiang," *China Year Book*, 1934.

36. *Memorandum on Chinese Eastern Turkestan* (American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations), April 27, 1933.

peace and prosperity had led to an increase in the population, which resulted in a migration of the Turki farmers into the nomad lands of the north.⁴⁰ Largely because settled agricultural communities were more easily governed and taxed, this movement was favored by the Chinese officials, even though it aroused resentment among the Mongols and Kasaks. Furthermore, subsidies formerly paid to the tribal leaders were gradually reduced or abolished; in some cases, where the native chief was weak, the subsidies were replaced by levies. Thus, even under Governor Yang's rule, Chinese policy was becoming more opportunistic, generating widespread native discontent.

The primary external influence was the Soviet trade dominance established in Sinkiang subsequent to 1925. Soviet geographical proximity was reenforced in 1930 by the completion of the Turk-Sib Railway, which paralleled the Sinkiang border for hundreds of miles. The relatively short caravan hauls to the railway, as well as newly constructed motor roads, quickly established it as the natural outlet for Sinkiang's products. These advantages were strengthened by the Soviet policy of "free trade" with certain Eastern countries, whereby Moscow's foreign trade monopoly was relaxed in colonial areas not dominated by foreign capital.⁴¹ Finally, every effort was made to establish cordial relations with the local Sinkiang rulers. Soviet extraterritorial privileges were abolished in Sinkiang as early as 1920, four years before this step was taken in China proper.⁴² Further Sino-Soviet agreements in 1925 and later provided for the exchange of consular representatives and other measures to facilitate trade.⁴³ As a result of these combined factors, Soviet trade with Sinkiang has forged steadily ahead. Whereas in 1923-1924 Soviet imports from Sinkiang were valued at 3,015,000 rubles and exports at 418,000 rubles, the corresponding figures for 1932 were 12,305,000 and 15,698,000 rubles.⁴⁴

Although there is no evidence that Soviet commercial penetration has been accompanied by political activity in Sinkiang,⁴⁵ the effects of the economic impact alone contributed greatly to the difficulties of the local Chinese rulers. The well-organized Soviet trading organs rapidly acquired virtual monopoly powers over prices and the type of goods imported, and the Soviet Union's controlled currency soon dominated Sin-

kiang financially.⁴⁶ Under these circumstances, the trading profits of the Chinese officials were greatly curtailed. Trade prosperity, however, had enabled the Chinese administration to function without undue pressure on the subject races. In its absence, the Chinese rulers resorted to higher taxation and even to deposition of native chiefs—a policy that added fuel to the smoldering resentment of the native peoples.

At this juncture another foreign factor intervened. In 1929, when the international embargo on arms exports to China was lifted, Sinkiang became able to import arms through India. Possession of these arms gave the Chinese authorities an unwarranted feeling of security, which led to a series of political blunders. Late in 1930 the Chinese officials sought to assume direct administration of the independent principality of Hami.⁴⁷ The Hami Turkis rose in revolt, defeated the poorly trained Chinese troops, and allied themselves with a small force of Kansu Moslems led by Ma Chung-ying, an ambitious young Moslem general.⁴⁸ A request by the Chinese authorities for military aid from the Torgot Mongols of Karashar was refused,⁴⁹ upon which their ruler—the ablest Mongol prince in Sinkiang—was treacherously slain.⁵⁰ This affair alienated all the Sinkiang Mongols, who took up an attitude of passive insubordination. In 1931-1932 the Moslem forces successively occupied Barkol and Turfan, and early in 1933 threatened to capture Urumchi, the provincial capital. By this time, however, the Chinese had organized a force of White Russians, supplemented by several thousand Manchurian Chinese troops repatriated through Siberia. Urumchi was saved,⁵¹ and in the course of 1933 the Moslem forces steadily lost ground. By the end of the year, the Chinese authorities had largely re-established their military position in the north. Three years of civil conflict, however, had taken a heavy toll in administrative disorganization, drastic currency depreciation, and general economic decline.

In southern Sinkiang, moreover, Chinese authority had been completely thrown off, resulting in a confused struggle between various Moslem groups in the oasis cities of

46. Conolly, *Soviet Economic Policy in the East*, cited, p. 120-121.

47. The Hami ruler had died, after which the Chinese set aside his heir and attempted to increase taxes.

48. Ma Chung-ying cherished a deep resentment against the Chinese, owing to the arbitrary execution of his brother in Kansu some years earlier. Cf. Lattimore, "Chinese Turkistan or Hsinchiang," cited.

49. The refusal was natural, since it was common knowledge that a plot laid by the Chinese authorities in 1930 to unseat this Karashar ruler had miscarried. "Recent Events in Sinkiang," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, January 1934, p. 82-83.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

51. Not before the White Russian mercenaries had gotten out of hand and driven the Governor—Chin Shu-jen—from the province. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

40. *Ibid.*
41. For discussion of this policy, cf. Violet Conolly, *Soviet Economic Policy in the East* (London, Oxford University Press, 1933), Chap. I.

42. Morse and MacNair, *Far Eastern International Relations*, cited, p. 671.

43. Conolly, *Soviet Economic Policy in the East*, cited, p. 124-125.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

45. *Memorandum on Chinese Eastern Turkestan*, cited, p. 3.

Kashgaria. Early in 1934 an "independent" Moslem régime, supported by the Emir of Khotan, was established in this region, with Kashgar as its capital.⁵² The strength of this régime is problematical, since it is opposed by other local elements.⁵³ It is still uncertain whether, as Soviet sources allege, British interests in Kashgaria are supporting the "independence" movement. British policy in Sinkiang has traditionally favored the maintenance of Chinese rule, which seems to have been the purpose behind the arms importations in 1930.⁵⁴ Increasing Soviet dominance in Sinkiang, and the present weakness of China, may have forced a change in this policy. The physical difficulty of maintaining contact with Kashgaria, either through Kashmir or Tibet, handicaps the extension of effective British support to an "independent" régime in that region. Unless thoroughgoing British assistance is forthcoming, however, the maintenance of an autonomous Kashgarian state against combined Soviet and Chinese opposition seems hardly possible.

Although the spectre of a united Moslem revolt has temporarily become less ominous, China's position in its far western dominion is by no means reassuring. Recent events have stirred the Nanking régime to action. In October 1933, after relieving Lo Wen-kan of his post as Foreign Minister, the Nanking authorities dispatched him on a spectacular airplane journey to Sinkiang, where he sought to reconcile the warring groups. Failing in this attempt, he passed on to Novosibirsk for a conference with Dr. W. W. Yen, Chinese Ambassador at Moscow.⁵⁵ At the same time, the Nanking government has engaged Dr. Sven Hedin, the famous Swedish explorer of Central Asia, to make the preliminary survey for a proposed motor highway into Sinkiang.⁵⁶ Improved communication facilities are essential if China is to regain its old position in Turkistan.

YUNNAN—A FRENCH SPHERE

From its base in Indo-China, French influence radiates over a large section of southern China. Although most effective in Yunnan province, it also extends to the provinces of Kwangsi, Kweichow, and Kwangtung, thus constituting an area as large as Japan's sphere in Manchuria.⁵⁷ Yunnan province is a territory of nearly 150,000

square miles with a population of some 11 million, about two-thirds of which are Chinese and the rest various aboriginal tribes. French economic and political power in Yunnan rests on the Haiphong-Yunnanfu railway, which provides the sole practicable means of access to the province.⁵⁸ Customs and transit charges levied on goods entering Yunnan via the railway are so manipulated by the French authorities as to render effective competition by non-French goods impossible.⁵⁹ Furthermore, whereas French goods require a week in transit, non-French goods often require six months, and then are likely to arrive in damaged condition.⁶⁰ The operation of these factors has placed the greater part of the business and trade of Yunnan province in French hands.⁶¹

Yunnan politics is equally subject to French influence, since by its control of the railway France is enabled to supply the bulk of the munitions used by the Yunnan army. If the Yunnan régime should prove refractory, the supplies of French arms can be easily diverted to a new claimant for the Yunnan governorship.⁶² In recent years, however, the present Yunnan governor—General Lung Yun—has worked satisfactorily with the Indo-China authorities. The French representatives in Yunnan have also cultivated existing middle-class elements. There is considerable French entertainment of influential Chinese, and about half the foreign-educated Chinese in the Yunnan administration are returned students from France.⁶³

For the present, however, there seems to be no compelling urge toward the assumption of direct political control by the French authorities.⁶⁴ Whether the step will ultimately be taken depends chiefly on the extent of pressure from third powers that may accumulate on the borders of the French sphere. Effective Chinese opposition is not possible at present, and is very unlikely in the near future. With Japan, the French authorities have maintained a close working agreement in the Far East since the signing of the treaty of June 10, 1907. In

52. *New York Times*, January 24, 1934.

53. Disorders attending the fighting at Kashgar on February 14, 1934 led to the death of one member and the wounding of four others on the staff of the British consulate. *Ibid.*, March 17, 1934; also *Foreign Affairs in Parliament*, March 19, 1934, p. 37.

54. Lattimore, "Chinese Turkistan or Hsinchiang," cited.

55. *China Weekly Review*, September 23, 1933, p. 144-145; September 30, 1933, p. 200; October 14, 1933, p. 293.

56. *New York Times*, October 29, 1933.

57. French expansion in this area, however, is not motivated by the compelling interests of a crowded population or of military insecurity, as in the case of Japan. It is related more to the interests of certain financial and business groups in France, which are seeking raw materials and commercial outlets. Cf. *Memorandum on French Indo-China* (American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations), March 10, 1934.

58. The Yunnan section was completed in 1910 at a cost of approximately \$32,000,000, supplied entirely from French sources. C. F. Remer, *Foreign Investments in China* (New York, Macmillan, 1933), p. 624.

59. Wilbur Burton, *China Weekly Review*, September 16, 1933, p. 102-105. One of a series of six articles prepared as the result of a first-hand study of Yunnan in 1933.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 105-106.

61. *Ibid.*, September 2, 1933, p. 14.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

63. *Ibid.*, September 30, 1933, p. 190.

64. Their indirect control is expanding. Note French activities in Kwangsi. *New York Times*, April 19, 1934.

this treaty France and Japan pledged mutual support for the maintenance of their territorial rights in Asia and for assuring the peace and security of "the regions of the Chinese Empire adjacent to the territories where they have the rights of sovereignty, protection or occupation."⁶⁵ By a further exchange of notes, not made public with the treaty, France and Japan defined the specific territorial limits of this agreement "on the one part and as concerned France, as the three southern Chinese provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan; and, on the other part and as concerned Japan, as Fukien, and, in the northeast, the regions of Manchuria, and Mongolia, in which Japan had special rights."⁶⁶ Despite the French opposition at Geneva to Japan's occupation of Manchuria, the respective Franco-Japanese spheres in the Far East are so distinct that the continuation of a general working agreement on the customary basis may be safely anticipated.

Serious British encroachment on the French sphere has seemed equally remote. Of late, however, the Tibetan advances in Hsikang province have led to incursions over the northern Yunnan border.⁶⁷ British forces in Upper Burma have also been encroaching on a section of Yunnan where the border-line has never been accurately defined.⁶⁸ The possible effects of the Dalai Lama's death on British action in Tibet also bear directly on Yunnan's status. None of these developments, however, has yet reached an acute stage. Barring determined intrusion on Yunnan by a third power or the disturbances incidental to a major Far Eastern conflict, it seems probable that the present French position in south-western China will be maintained.

CONCLUSION

Four great powers—Japan, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France—confront each other on China's land frontier. Their territorial spheres of influence have been jostled together by Japan's seizure of Manchuria, resulting in heightened tension and a marked increase of political activity. The elbow space of each power has been reduced, so that from Manchuria through Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet to Yunnan, forces set in motion in one area have direct repercussions in the others. For this reason, the proclama-

tion of a Moslem state in southern Sinkiang, the advance of Tibetan troops into Hsikang province, or the activities of Japanese forces in the vicinity of Dolonor are much more than local incidents in out of the way places. They are maneuvers to feel out the strength of the opposition, episodes in a continental struggle over China's outlying territories.

Owing to the momentum acquired in its Manchurian operations, the strongest initiative in the interplay of forces lies at present with Japan. From the strategic Japanese outpost in eastern Chahar province, looking toward further penetration of Inner Mongolia, the next determined move may be launched. The enthronement of Pu Yi reinforces this possibility, and opens up new vistas in Japan's continental policy. As an island empire, Japan cannot permit the development of a strong and united China. Japan's future on the Asiatic mainland would be best secured by the establishment of a series of minor states, over which it could exercise hegemony. The first step in this direction was taken with the creation of Manchoukuo. The second step would be the establishment of a Mongolkuo, which by historical precedent might logically acknowledge the suzerainty of the Manchoukuo Emperor. Such a Mongolian state, however, could hardly be set up before a test of strength with the Soviet Union, for which Outer Mongolia constitutes a vulnerable flank. If it were successfully accomplished, Japan would confront both Great Britain and the Soviet Union in western China. Out of the ensuing struggle, a Moslem state—dominated by one or other of the great powers—would almost certainly emerge.

In the course of these events, China would be reduced to the dimensions of a lesser state, dominated by Japan and its continental allies. It is already evident that the Nanking government is in no position to interpose effective opposition to Japan's continental ambitions. Despite the loss of Manchuria, the factional divisions within the Kuomintang remain as acute as ever. The growth of the Chinese Communist movement has added a new and incalculable element to the continuing struggle among the various Kuomintang warlords. In both its internal and external policy, the Nanking government has been placed strictly on the defensive. Nor can it longer reckon with any confidence on effective aid from the United States. In the test over Manchuria, the historic "open door" policy of the United States, with its corollary requiring the maintenance of China's territorial integrity, has apparently suffered a decisive setback. More than at any time since 1900, tendencies leading toward the dismemberment of China are definitely in the ascendant.

65. John V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1921), Vol. I, p. 640.

66. Quoted from A. Gérard, *Ma Mission au Japon*, by Ernest Baisson Price in *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 concerning Manchuria and Mongolia* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1933), p. 32.

67. Cf. Wilbur Burton, "Ominous Maneuvers in Southwestern China," *China Weekly Review*, October 28, 1933, p. 360-362.

68. The Nanking government has protested this affair both locally and through the Chinese Ambassador at London. *China Weekly Review*, March 3, 1934, p. 28.